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Abstract: EU Competence and Intellectual Property Rights. Internally Shared, Ex-
ternally Exclusive? Abstract: The European Union’s competence in external relations 
remains widely debated whenever the conclusion of an international agreement is 
about to happen. The recent focus mainly concerns the EU’s planned external trade 
agreements which grant it exclusive competence in this area. This is particularly com-
plex in the field of intellectual property rights, where the EU has exclusive compe-
tence only with respect to the commercial aspects of the domain. This paper examines 
how the notion of the commercial aspects of intellectual property is interpreted by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. We also analyze the possible implications of 
the broad approach adopted by the Court. In this regard, we first discuss the Court’s 
line of argument in the Daiichi Sankyo case. Then we scrutinize and verify the in-
terpretation applied by the Court, which is significant in order to predict future case 
law developments in this area. We also relate the Court’s verdict to the EU’s internal 
regulations which brings us to the conclusion that the approaches taken in external 
trade relations and within the internal market contradict each other, leading to a legal 
or interpretative dead-end. Although detailed and specific, the results of this analysis 
make it possible to understand the complexities underlying the political turbulences 
that often occur when the EU negotiates international trade treaties.
Key words: EU’s exclusive competence, EU’s external relations, commercial aspects 
of intellectual property, common commercial policy
Introduction
The general objective of this article is to discuss the scope of the con-cept of commercial aspects of intellectual property as laid down in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in the con-
text of the EU’s external relation. In order to answer the main research 
question, we need to examine the following specific problems.
1 Project has been financed by the funds of the Polish National Science Centre 
pursuant to the decision No. DEC-2013/11/N/HS5/04106/1.
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Firstly, if we assume – as the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU, or the 
Court) ruled – that the above mentioned concept enjoys a very broad sco-
pe, we come to the question whether indeed intellectual property rights in 
external relations belong to the EU’s exclusive competence. Should the 
answer be in affirmative, then we would need to look at the interrelation 
between creation of intellectual property rights in external relations on the 
one hand and in the internal market on the other. In the second case, the 
Court has already ruled that this competence is shared between the EU 
and its Member States. Therefore, we need to examine what might be the 
consequences of such a dual approach.
Secondly, we would like to put the main research objective in the bro-
ader context of defining the EU’s external competence after adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The question here is what tendencies we can witness in 
the Court’s case-law when it comes to the definition of the EU’s exclusive 
competence in this field. Having established that, we will look at the po-
tential consequences of the defined approach.
Thirdly, we need to take a closer look at a method of interpretation of 
the TFEU that brought the Court to the conclusion that almost all aspects 
of intellectual property are commercial. The line of reasoning adopted 
by the Court seems prima	facie to contradict the previously adopted me-
thods of interpretation both of the Treaties and international agreements, 
to which the EU is a party.
Our general research objective as well as the specific problems we have 
outlined above were ignited by the Court’s judgment of 18 July 2013 in the 
case C-414/11 Daiichi	Sankyo	and	Sanofi-Aventis	Deutschland (ECLI:EU: 
C:2013:520; hereinafter: Daiichi	Sankyo). Even though it is not the most 
recent one and it has already been discussed in the literature, it seems evi-
dent that the dynamic context of the functioning of the EU implies that 
the ruling and its consequences require a further analysis allowing more 
thorough understanding of the problems we set. The present events, e.g. 
doubts concerning competence to negotiate and sign the Canada-EU Trade 
Agreement (CETA), prove that many problems are not fixed yet. The scope 
of the EU’s exclusive competence in the common commercial policy is also 
subject to questions addressed to the Court in the framework of Opinion 
2/15 (concerning Free Trade Agreement with Singapore) proceedings.2 Fi-
2 See also: Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing on behalf of the Euro-
pean Union of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada 
of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, 
5.7.2016, COM(2016)444 final, Explanatory memorandum, point 2.
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nally, the question of competence in the field of intellectual property rights 
may retain significance in the context of the so-called Brexit if only the 
United Kingdom and European Union decide to arrange future relations in 
the framework of a free trade agreement.
The Daiichi Sankyo case
The case was heard within the preliminary ruling procedure by the 
Court sitting in its Grand Chamber. The dispute before the national co-
urt concerned marketing of medicinal products, while it was questiona-
ble if they still were subject to protection granted by patents and supple-
mentary protection certificates. The first question, however, concerned 
the status of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (the TRIPs Agreement), constituting Annex 1C to the 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO), signed 
at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 and approved by the Council Decision 
94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf 
of the European Community. More specifically, the question arose with 
respect to Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement, which provides for con-
ditions of patentability:
Patentable Subject Matter
 1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall 
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, 
in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application. (5) Sub-
ject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and 
paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of inven-
tion, the field of technology and whether products are imported or 
locally produced.
 2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of 
which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not 
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
 3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment 
of humans or animals;
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(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essen-
tially biological processes for the production of plants or ani-
mals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant 
varieties either by patents or by an effective sui	generis system 
or by any combination thereof. The provisions of this subpara-
graph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement.
The Greek court needed to establish whether the quoted provision be-
longed to the Member States’ primary competence and consequently if 
those States were still entitled to grant this provision direct effect. The 
national court asked also whether it could apply the said provision direc-
tly in national proceedings, provided that national criteria for such appli-
cation were satisfied.
Essentially, that question of the national court concerned interpreta-
tion of Article 207 TFEU which provides for the common commercial po-
licy, in the field of which the EU is exclusively competent. According to 
Article 207(1) TFEU, “the common commercial policy shall be based on 
uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and se-
rvices, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct 
investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, 
export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in 
the event of dumping or subsidies.” It needs to be stressed that this pro-
vision has been significantly changed with the Treaty of Lisbon, and thus 
the Greek court’s question gains its importance.3 Therefore, in brief, it 
was necessary to decide in that case the scope of the common	commercial	
policy concept and whether it embraces the whole TRIPs Agreement. As 
it occurred, the approach adopted by the Court was remarkably different 
in comparison to the line of case-law settled within the hitherto legislative 
framework (Larik, 2015, pp. 791–792).
Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered his opinion in that case on 
31 January 2013. At first, he rightly defined the essence of the described 
problem as “the extent to which the matters governed by the TRIPs Agre-
3 At the same time, it is not the aim of this contribution to analyse Article 133 
EC (preceding Article 207 TFEU) and the Merck	Genéricos (Case C-431/05 [2007] 
ECR I-7001) line of case-law. For a comprehensive elaboration of the issue of build-
ing the EU’s exclusive competence in commercial policy see: P. Eeckhout, 2012, 
pp. 613–636.
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ement – and therefore the interpretation of the relevant law – now fall 
within the exclusive competence for commercial policy in so far as they 
constitute commercial	aspects	of	intellectual	property” (para. 40). Before 
undertaking the analysis of the problem, AG Cruz Villalón also remin-
ded what intellectual property rights and TRIPs Agreement were. This 
was important in order to underline the problem of defining a borderline 
between regulating substantive intellectual property rights (as provisions 
governing patentable subject matter) on the one hand and those that relate 
to trade in goods or services.
Then, AG Cruz Villalón referred to the nominalist argument raised 
by the Commission. To put it briefly, the Commission claimed that the 
concepts of trade-related	aspects	of	intellectual	property and commercial	
aspects	of	intellectual	property have almost the same wording, hence the 
meaning and semantic range should be the same. Consequently, the issue 
of patentability should also fall within the scope of commercial	aspects	of	
intellectual	property, as it is regulated by the agreement concerning tra-
de-related	aspects	of	IPRs. The Advocate General concluded, however, 
that this concept “must be an autonomous concept of European Union 
law and that the Court must be independently responsible for its interpre-
tation, instead of its meaning being determined, in a more or less stable 
or consistent way, by the agreements to which the European Union is 
a party” (para. 58).
For the second point, AG Cruz Villalón referred to the problem of 
interrelation in the field of intellectual property protection in the internal 
market and in external relations. This point is crucial, since regulating 
intellectual property in the internal market remains shared competence 
between the EU and Member States,4 contrary to the EU’s exclusive com-
petence in the field of commercial aspects of intellectual property. In that 
regard, the Advocate General concluded that regulation of patentable sub-
ject matter (as it is in Article 27 TRIPs) is purely substantive matter and 
has no direct commercial connotations. Stating otherwise and granting 
the EU exclusive competence in that regard would affect, if not ‘deactiva-
te’, shared competence in the internal market (paras. 60–61).
These are just two main threads of the elaborate and in-depth opinion 
of AG Cruz Villalón, who examined also the counter-arguments to those 
he posed. Effectively, he concluded that Article 27 TRIPs does not regu-
4 Judgment of 16 April 2013, joined cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Spain and Italy 
v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:240.
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late subject-matter that would fall within the commercial aspects of intel-
lectual property as set out in Article 207(1) TFEU and, therefore, does not 
fall within the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence.
The Court did not share the views of AG Cruz Villalón and came to 
different conclusions. The Court departed from the assumption that ru-
les adopted by the EU in the field of intellectual property fall within the 
concept of commercial	aspects	of	intellectual	property only if they have 
specific link to international trade (para. 52). Then it concluded that this 
is exactly the case of the TRIPs Agreement, which forms part of the WTO 
system and, therefore, in its entirety it is linked with trade.
The argumentation of the Court is rather terse (Van Damme, 2015, 
p. 80). Firstly, the link with international trade was interpreted from the 
Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of di-
sputes (hereinafter: DSU), which forms Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement 
and applies to the TRIPs Agreement. Article 22 (3) DSU allows cross-su-
spension of concessions between principal WTO agreements, including 
the TRIPs Agreement. Therefore, indeed failure to respect some obliga-
tions derived from the TRIPs may have consequences in relation to other 
trade regulations.
Secondly, according to the Court, the authors of the FEU Treaty were 
perfectly aware that the term commercial	aspects	of	IP corresponds ‘al-
most literally’ to trade-related	aspects.
Thirdly, the Court examined the argument concerning the troublesome 
relation between regulating intellectual property in external and internal 
dimension, where competence remains respectively exclusive and shared. 
According to the Member States, Article 27 TRIPs should be subject to 
the latter competence. However, that problem – said the Court – does not 
rebut the assumption that the TRIPs Agreement as a whole has specific 
link to international trade, since it aims at “strengthening and harmoni-
sing the protection of intellectual property on a worldwide scale”. It also 
follows from the Agreement’s preamble that its aim is to reduce distor-
tions in international trade.
To sum up, the Court limited its reasoning to interpretation of the 
TRIPs Agreement, concluding that it falls within the concept of com-
mercial aspects of intellectual property as provided in Article 207 TFEU. 
Therefore, no autonomous meaning was granted by the Court to that con-
cept.
From further developments, it seems that Daiichi	Sankyo	will consti-
tute a point of departure for what is called the Court’s settled case-law. In 
ŚSP 1 ’17	 EU	Competence	and	Intellectual	Property	Rights...	 33
his opinion delivered in the opinion procedure 3/15,5 AG Wahl follows the 
Court’s reasoning when concerning the concept of commercial	aspects	of	
intellectual	property. Basing his reasoning on the said case, the Advoca-
te General finds the link between international trade and the Marrakesh 
Treaty6 from the fact that some of that Treaty’s provisions influence the 
international exchange in goods and services (para. 46) as well as from 
the aim of the Marrakesh Treaty and its links to the TRIPs Agreement.
The Court’s method of interpretation
Before examining the substantive issues, we would like to focus on 
the way the Court interpreted Article 207 TFEU and the concept of com-
mercial	aspects	of	intellectual	property. As we will try to prove, the for-
mal questions in this field effectively surmount the substantive	ones. The 
problem is worth giving a closer look for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it 
is rather rare that either advocate generals or the Court refer to particular 
methods or philosophies of interpretation. Secondly, it is seen even less 
often when the Court interprets EU law (which is believed to be built on 
autonomous concepts) through concepts introduced by international law 
that entered into force even after the Rome Treaties.
Advocate General Villalón defined this problem in Daiichi	Sankyo	as 
a conflict of contradicting methods of interpretation. On the one hand, 
functional interpretation aiming at guaranteeing full effectiveness of EU 
law would advocate for a holistic approach resulting in a broader meaning 
of the concept of commercial	aspects	of	intellectual	property. On the other 
hand, a systematic way (or: ‘topographical’, ‘compartmentalised’) would 
require a substantive analysis of each TRIPs Agreement’s provision to be 
done separately, which could result in concluding that some of them be-
long to the EU’s exclusive competence while some do not. The Advocate 
General then concluded that effectiveness of Article 207 TFEU would 
not have been undermined if the Court decided that Article 27 TRIPs 
remained in the sphere of shared competence. Moreover, effectiveness 
of that provision could have been strengthened with other means such as 
gradual harmonisation and unification of IPRs within the EU – to which 
5 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 8 September 2016 
(ECLI:EU:C:2016:657).
6 The Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who 
Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled.
34	 Anna	Wilińska-Zelek,	Miłosz	Malaga	 ŚSP 1 ’17
competence remains shared between the Union and its Member States. 
The Court, however, did not follow these conclusions.
The present authors share the view that deciding otherwise than the 
Court did would not undermine the effectiveness of Article 207 TFEU. At 
least, no convincing argument or evidence in that matter was submitted 
to the Court and it did not actually adjudicate in this regard. Therefore, 
it is difficult to discuss that matter in its merits as it is far too abstract. It 
also needs to be remembered that effectiveness of EU law has its limits 
and does not prevail over other arguments,7 being subject to balancing of 
values and interests just as any other ones.
What is more interesting is the fact that the Court interpreted the con-
cept of commercial	 aspects	 of	 IPRs on the basis of international agre-
ement. By doing so, it seems to have deprived that concept of the EU 
autonomous meaning.
The Court concluded that the term commercial	aspects	of	IPRs is al-
most literally identical to trade-related	aspects	of	IPRs, which forms the 
title of the TRIPs Agreement. We would not like to enter philosophical or 
theoretical discussion on ontology, albeit it is difficult to accept the sta-
tement that the name determines the essence. The sole fact of similarity 
of names should not affirm similarity of contents. It is so especially when 
the latter derives from different legal orders and different legal contexts. 
The Court shared this view, e.g. in the Demirkan8 case. It concerned the 
question whether freedom to provide services set out in Article 56 TFEU 
and the Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey with its Additional Protocol has the 
same scope and meaning, even when the wording remained identical. The 
answer was in negative, as the Court concluded that “the interpretation 
given to the provisions of European Union law, including Treaty provi-
sions, concerning the internal market cannot be automatically applied by 
analogy to the interpretation of an agreement concluded by the European 
Union with a non-Member State, unless there are express provisions to 
that effect laid down by the agreement itself” (para. 44). Therefore, one 
may ask why the Court is reluctant to interpret international agreements 
7 What seems to be the case, e.g. in C-119/15 BP	Partner (AG opinion of 2.6.2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:387, the case is still pending) where the Court will probably decide 
that the national system of consumer protection against was – to simplify it – ‘over-
effective’ as for the EU law standards.
8 Judgment of 24.9.2013, C-221/11 Demirkan, ECLI:EU:C:2013:583 (Grand 
Chamber).
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through EU law, while it allows the opposite direction of interpretation in 
Daiichi	Sankyo.
When taking the functional approach into consideration, the Court 
did not limit itself to comparing the wording of commercial	aspects and 
trade-related	aspects of intellectual property. It also settled that a direct 
link to international trade was a decisive factor whether something falls 
or not within the concept of commercial	aspects	of	IPRs. The postulate of 
looking for the mentioned direct link with international trade seems to be 
legitimate (yet problematic, Dimopoulos, 2014, pp. 220–221). However, 
the Court in this regard continued to examine the whole TRIPs Agre-
ement and its preamble, not referring particularly to Article 27 TRIPs, 
which was subject to the preliminary question. To put it briefly, the Court 
concluded that since the TRIPs preamble states that the Agreement’s aim 
is to reduce barriers in trade, then the entire Agreement as such is directly 
linked to trade.
However, this line of reasoning seems to be incorrect. As it was sta-
ted above, it is not only the name, but also the (creator’s, or legislator’s) 
intent that determines the essence. The present authors claim though, and 
it is rather obvious, that one needs to examine the actual content to know 
what it consists of. There is no reason to limit one’s interpretation only 
to the goals companying the legal act. If we remain consistent with the 
Court’s line of reasoning, it would be very easy to circumvent the Treaty’s 
provisions on competence and regulate some matters by concluding an 
international agreement with a title and preamble stating one thing and 
the substantive provisions dealing with something else.
Even if the above argument may seem absurd, it is not very far away 
from the Daiichi	Sankyo	conclusions. If we look at the question of paten-
table subject-matter, it obviously reveals no direct link with international 
trade in its substance. Of course, in the modern economic system almost 
everything may be subject to trade relations, albeit this pessimistic conclu-
sion should not be argument for interpretation of the concept of commercial	
aspects	of	intellectual	property. If we assume that even patentability of in-
ventions falls within the scope of that concept, it leads to the conclusion that 
there are no other aspects of intellectual property, but commercial ones.9 
That finds confirmation in the above-quoted AG Wahl’s opinion delivered 
in the opinion procedure 3/15. The Advocate General concluded there that 
9 With the possible exception, e.g. to the personal rights that may be derived from 
copyrights and are not subject to the TRIPs Agreement.
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non-economic intellectual property rights provide for a clearly residual ca-
tegory: “broadly speaking, intellectual property rules are meant to confer 
certain exclusive rights regarding the exploitation of creations of the intel-
lect in order to foster creativity and innovation. Those exclusive rights are 
nothing but sui generis forms of monopolies which may limit the free circu-
lation of goods or services. Thus, by their very nature, intellectual property 
rules are mostly trade-related” (para. 56).
The link between trade and intellectual property protection has been 
subject to the Court’s review with respect to the free movement provi-
sions. This line of case-law and vague formulation of commercial	aspects	
of	 IP allows, according to Tanghe, three interpretations of that concept 
(Tanghe, 2016, pp. 32–35).
The first one, proposed, inter	alia, by Eeckhout, claims that the com-
mon commercial policy applies if there is a risk of diverging external po-
licies by the Member States, which could lead to competition distortions 
within the EU. Consequently, the common commercial policy would form 
a sort of counterpart of the internal market legal basis set out in Article 
114 TFEU. Tanghe recognizes that this interpretation ensures coherence 
between internal and external policies as well as provides for efficient 
methods of analysis developed under internal market regime. However, 
she claims that this approach cannot be adopted in the field of intellectual 
property, since national intellectual property rights do not restrict trade 
in terms of Article 34 TFEU. It is so because they can be justified on the 
grounds of derogations set out in Article 36 TFEU. That leads her to conc-
lusion that accepting the said approach would mean that all intellectual 
property legislation is excluded from the common commercial policy.
The present authors have two remarks about that criticism. Firstly, it 
is rather believed that Articles 34–36 TFEU provide for at least a twostep 
analysis. The first thing is to decide whether a national measure (also 
exercise of intellectual property measures) constitutes a measure having 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. Only afterwards the second 
step is taken, where it is analysed if such a measure may be justified on 
the basis of derogations from Article 36 TFEU. If it may, it still consti-
tutes a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions, yet 
it is justified and, therefore, not unlawful (f.ex. Gormley, 2015,	p. 928; 
Enchelmaier, 2010, p. 21610). Secondly, given that the said premise was 
10 It seems therefore that the author confuses exceptions from Article 36 TFEU with 
the so-called ‘mandatory requirements’ following from the Cassis	de	Dijon case-law.
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wrong, it is also the conclusion that is not right: it follows from the Co-
urt’s settled case-law on Articles 34–36 TFEU that even if we consider 
that the internal market and common commercial policy are two sides of 
the same coin, still some	aspects of intellectual property may fall within 
those legal orders.
The second interpretation boils down to – known from the Court’s ca-
se-law concerning internal market – the division of intellectual property 
into moral and economic rights. These could be therefore the moral rights 
(we can assume they consist, e.g. of the author’s right to be associated 
with his work) that do not fall within the scope of commercial aspects 
of IPRs. Also here, Tanghe does not agree with such an approach cla-
iming – as in the first case of interpretation – that the Court follows diffe-
rent reasoning and develops different concepts in the internal market and 
commercial policy areas. To the present authors, the suggested division 
into moral and economic rights does not seem to be coherent, mutually 
exclusive and logical. In order for it to be a ‘good’ division, there may be 
no case of rights being both moral and economic at the same time. Whe-
reas patentability of inventions or author’s basic rights seem to fall within 
both spheres. However, the sole idea of dividing aspects of intellectual 
property rights into commercial	or trade-related and others seems rather 
obvious and reflects the idea presented by the Court in Daiichi	Sankyo.	
However, defining the borderline between them constitutes the main pro-
blem appearing in that case.
The third approach concerns examination of the general objectives 
and the rationale of the EU’s competence in the common commercial po-
licy. The goals of CCP can be identified from Articles 205–207 TFEU and 
Article 21 TEU which constitute in general that the EU is to contribute 
to harmonious development of the world trade, progressive abolition of 
trade and foreign direct investment restrictions, etc. The main rationale 
seems to be integrating countries into the world economy by pursuing 
gradual liberalisation and abolishing international trade restrictions. The-
se general goals lead Tanghe to the conclusion that measures having spe-
cific link to international trade are these that actually aim at eliminating 
or maintaining the same degree of liberalisation. Following from this, the 
author concludes that the Court’s ‘pragmatic approach’ in Daiichi	Sankyo	
can be justified. Intellectual property rights are significant part of interna-
tional trade, which can be reflected in the number of disputes concerning 
the TRIPs Agreement. Therefore, disconnecting the common commercial 
policy and the WTO system could seem artificial and ineffective.
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However, this approach may be questioned, for it still does not solve 
the problem of substantive content of the agreement that entirely falls 
within the common commercial policy. Of course, the Court should not 
be required to conduct any economic analysis of each provision of the 
TRIPs, albeit it seems accurate to expect it balances the commercial or 
economic substance of each provision with its other aspects. Depending 
on which prevails, it should either fall within the scope of Article 207 
TFEU or not.
The three said ways of interpretation do not seem to exclude each 
other. On the contrary, it would be rather worrying if general rationale 
of common commercial policy could contradict or oppose to the goals of 
the internal market. Therefore, all three postulates should be taken into 
account and balanced in order to obtain coherent interpretation, in which 
both internal and external dimensions of the EU action could co-exist. 
Following from the foregoing, the present authors claim that each provi-
sion of the TRIPs Agreement should be evaluated separately with regard 
to the field of competence, regardless of the name, preamble or the goals 
of the Agreement itself.
These are not the only methods of interpretation that can be found in 
the literature. For instance, Kampf advocates for a more holistic and dy-
namic approach when looking for a direct link between trade and intellec-
tual property (Kampf, 2015, pp. 113–117). However fair and right it may 
be, this postulate seems far too general to be applied when interpreting the 
concept of commercial	aspects	of	intellectual	property.
The EU’s competence in the field of intellectual property rights
It follows from the foregoing observations that the concept of com-
mercial	 aspects	 of	 intellectual	 property is interpreted broadly and it is 
justified to claim that almost all aspects of intellectual property enjoy 
a sufficient link with international trade. Therefore, they fall within the 
sphere of the EU’s exclusive competence. The consequences of this were 
defined by the Court in para. 59 of the Daiichi	Sankyo	ruling: “[A]dmit-
tedly, it remains altogether open to the European Union, after the entry 
into force of the FEU Treaty, to legislate on the subject of intellectual 
property rights by virtue of competence relating to the field of the internal 
market. However, acts adopted on that basis and intended to have validity 
specifically for the European Union will have to comply with the rules 
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concerning the availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights 
in the TRIPs Agreement, as those rules are still, as previously, intended 
to standardise certain rules on the subject at world level and thereby to 
facilitate international trade.” Such conclusions can be found also prior to 
the Daiichi	Sankyo judgment (Villalta Puig, 2011, p. 293).
Even if this perspective seems wide enough, before examining the 
interplay between external and internal competence in intellectual pro-
perty protection, we need to discuss the idea of the EU’s	implied	com-
petence, developed by the Court in Commission	v	Council.11 In this case 
the Commission sought for annulment of the Decision of the Council 
and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States me-
eting within the Council on the participation of the European Union and 
its Member States in negotiations for the Convention of the Council of 
Europe on the protection of the rights of broadcasting organisations, 
of 19 December 2011. In this decision, the EU and its Member States 
were jointly authorised to participate in negotiations for the Convention 
on the rights of broadcasting organisations drafted by the Council of 
Europe. Consequently, the decision was based on the assumption that 
the EU and the Member States share their competence in that field. Ho-
wever, it is worth mentioning that the broadcaster’s rights are regulated 
by a number of international (e.g. in the TRIPs Agreement) and the EU 
(Directives 2006/115/EC on Rental and Lending Rights, 2006/116 Sa-
tellite and Cable Directive and, to some extent, 2001/29 InfoSoc) legal 
acts (Woods, Peers).
The Commission argued that these negotiations would be based the-
refore on the EU’s acquis	 in that field. Consequently, it concluded that 
“where a body of rights gradually introduced by EU law reaches […] 
an advanced stage and the envisaged international agreement seeks to 
consolidate and, at most, to marginally improve the protection of the right 
holders concerned on peripheral aspects not currently covered by EU law, 
the European Union must have exclusive competence” (para. 46). More-
over, the Commission argued that the EU has already undertaken legisla-
tive initiatives in this field which go beyond setting minimum standards. 
The fact that it did not constitute full harmonisation measures would not 
prevent this sphere from falling within the EU’s exclusive competence. 
Lastly, the subject matter of the negotiations formed – according to the 
11 Judgment of 4 September 2014, Case C-114/12 Commission	 v	 Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2151 (Grand Chamber).
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Commission – a “consistent and balanced body of intellectual property” 
that intended to ensure the unity of the EU’s legal order.
The Court shared the Commission’s views, basing the judgment on 
the ERTA12 settled line of case-law. From a rather lengthy and detailed 
analysis the Court deduced that since a large part of the substance of the 
negotiations was already covered by EU law, these negotiations could af-
fect common EU rules or alter their scope. Consequently, competence to 
hold these negotiations should belong exclusively to the European Union. 
Therefore, one may conclude that externally the EU holds exclusive com-
petence in certain fields even if internally it has regulated a particular 
area only partially. This phenomenon may be called the EU’s implied 
exclusive competence.
The above described concept of the EU’s implied	competence seems 
to reveal the specific link that exists between internal and external dimen-
sions of the EU’s competence in intellectual property rights. It is worth 
mentioning that since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it provides 
in Article 118 TFEU for specific legal basis for creation of unitary IPRs. 
Concerning this provision, the Court has ruled that it confers competence 
in the context of establishment and functioning of the internal market 
and, therefore, in accordance with Article 4 (2) TFEU, this competence is 
shared between the EU and its Member States.13 The further cases concer-
ning the European unitary patent confirmed that statement.14
This brings the question whether AG Cruz Villalón was right in the 
Daiichi	Sankyo when concluding that combining in the field of IPRs the 
EU’s exclusive competence in external relations with shared one with re-
spect to internal market leads nowhere but to a dead end. This observation 
might be strengthened by the implied	exclusive	competence	doctrine as 
it occurs that the EU’s legislative initiatives within internal market may 
trigger exclusive external competence.
This indeed may lead to a paradox, which can be well illustrated by 
the European unitary patent example. The Member States could not reach 
a compromise concerning the details of the unitary patent protection sys-
12 Judgment of 31.03.1971, Case C-22/70 Commission	 v	 Council, ECLI:EU: 
C:1971:32.
13 Judgment of 16 April 2013, joined cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Spain	and	
Italy	v	Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:240, paras. 17 and following.
14 Judgments of 5.05.2015, cases C-146/13 Spain	 v	European	Parliament	 and	
Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:298, para 40 and C-147/13 Spain	 v	Council, ECLI:EU: 
C:2015:299.
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tem (mainly due to the language arrangements), which led to the launch 
of the enhanced cooperation procedure (on the history and legal structure 
of the European unitary patent see Plomer, 2015, pp. 508–533; Malaga, 
2014, pp. 621–647). Essentially, it means that the EU legal acts are adop-
ted just in a certain number of the Member States, leaving the possibility 
for the others of not participating and not having such a legal act binding 
in their legal orders. This procedure is prohibited in the domains where 
the EU holds exclusive competence, which is why Spain and Italy in the 
above-mentioned cases sought to prove that the EU is exclusively com-
petent with respect to creation of the said patent. The entry into force of 
the system would therefore result in having some Member States out of 
it. Anyway, they would be prohibited from undertaking any legislative 
actions that could compromise the unitary patent system, because the EU 
has had executed its competence in that field. This is a regular feature of 
shared competence. However, the fact of introducing enhanced coopera-
tion, strengthened by the TRIPs Agreement being in force, would imply 
the EU’s exclusive competence in this field in an external dimension. As 
a result, very little space for national initiatives in intellectual property 
rights domain remains for the Member States.
The other paradox could be revealed by the case of the Unified Patent 
Court Agreement. The latter is an international agreement concluded by 
the Member States that participate in the unitary patent enhanced coopera-
tion. The Agreement in its major part establishes15 the said Unified Patent 
Court, which is exclusively competent to hear cases concerning the unitary 
patent. However, the Agreement contains also some substantive provisions, 
including the right holder’s right to prevent both direct and indirect use of 
the invention (i.e. the purely commercial or trade-related	right, conferring 
a monopoly on its holder in particular domain). After the Daiichi	Sankyo	
an interesting question occurs whether the Member States had any com-
petence to negotiate and conclude between each other such international 
agreement. If we stay coherent with this case-law, then the answer might be 
in negative (or at least that the Court retains its jurisdiction over the Unified 
Patent Court Agreement: A. Dimopoulos, 2014, p. 232).
The foregoing observations lead to the conclusion that the Member 
States’ competence in intellectual property rights is significantly limited 
under the current regime. Firstly, they may not undertake any legislative 
15 To be more precise: is going to establish, since the ratification process has not 
ended yet and some major problems are expected due to potential Brexit.
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initiatives when the EU takes one in the field of the internal market. This is 
a normal consequence of shared competence concept. Secondly, however, 
they may not do anything that would compromise the EU’s international 
commitments in that domain. These commitments result from agreements 
to negotiation of which the EU (or the Commission) is exclusively compe-
tent. Consequently, one may conclude that the EU’s exclusive competence 
in IPRs – significantly developed in the discussed case-law – remarkably 
limits any Member States’ opportunities to act in this field.
This conclusion shall turn us to the wording of Article 207(6) which 
provides for:
The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in the 
field of the common commercial policy shall not affect the delimi-
tation of competences between the Union and the Member States, 
and shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory 
provisions of the Member States in so far as the Treaties exclude 
such harmonisation.
To simplify, the quoted provision, inter	alia, prohibits introduction of 
the EU’s exclusive competence through the ‘back door’ of common com-
mercial policy (on by-passing the EU’s internal shared competence: He-
stermeyer, 2013, p. 930.). It indeed seems to advocate strongly for coherent 
nature of the EU’s competence in both internal and external dimensions 
(more elaborate on the discussed provision: W. Weiß, 2013, p. 36 et	seq.).
Considering the interrelation of competence in IP rights in its internal 
and external dimensions, we need to look also at the question of justifica-
tions of restrictions in internal trade in goods. As it is commonly known 
and was signalised above in this article, the Member States may justify 
infringement of Article 34 TFEU on the basis of one of derogations listed 
in Article 36 TFEU. However, the primary interest of the Member States 
may never be of an economic nature: these are only non-economic values 
that benefit from Article 36 TFEU exemptions. However, one of these 
exceptions is ‘the protection of industrial and commercial property’, i.e. 
protection of intellectual property. Therefore, Article 36 TFEU reflects an 
assumption that protection of IPRs serves non-economic interests.
This brings us to discussion whether the notions of commercial	and 
trade-related on the one hand and (non-)economic on the other are diffe-
rent enough to conclude that they exclude each other. However, it seems 
very difficult to find convincing arguments that the very same rights mi-
ght be at the same time commercial	 (trade-related) and non-economic. 
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However, this is the consequence of the outlined reasoning of the Court 
according to which the decisive factor seems to be situated in either inter-
nal or external dimension of the EU’s policy.
To conclude, it clearly follows from the Court’s case-law that the EU 
is exclusively competent in almost all aspects of intellectual property pro-
tection when it comes to external relations. At the same time and with 
respect to substantively the same rights, the EU shares with the Member 
States its competence in the IP field of the internal market. That leads to 
at least two conclusions.
Firstly, however bizarre it may sound, the decision whether any aspect 
is commercial	or economic depends not on the substantive matter of that 
aspect, yet on its territorial application: whether it belongs to the inter-
nal market or the EU’s external action field. Therefore, the Court seems 
to adopt tacitly rather a formalistic and not substantive approach in that 
regard. It is, however, difficult to find any good legal or systemic reasons 
for justification of that approach. On the contrary, it rather seems to cle-
arly contradict the hitherto applied methods. At the same time, it needs 
to be admitted that such an approach results in clarity of interpretation, 
especially when compared to AG Cruz Villalón’s nuanced proposal (Got-
sova, 2014, p. 527).
Secondly, the shared competence in the field of the internal market 
will probably become more and more elusive. This competence is and 
will be significantly restricted by the scope of competence executed by 
the Union in its external relations.
Coming back to the AG Cruz Villalón’s question: does this way of 
interpretation lead to a dead end? If we perceive ‘a legal dead-end’ as 
no further possibilities of undertaking coherent and logical interpreta-
tion which leads to interpretative uncertainty and a sort of limbo, then 
probably the answer should be in affirmative. However, it looks clearly 
that even after provision of such self-contradicting case-law of the Court, 
there is still the way ahead. The only open question remains whether that 
way leads in any direction one could have imagined when the Lisbon 
Treaty was entering into force.
Conclusions
In this contribution, we have examined scope of the commercial	
aspects	 of	 intellectual	 property	 concept, as spelled out in Article 207 
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TFEU. Legal initiatives undertaken within that scope belong to the EU’s 
common commercial policy and, therefore, to its exclusive competence. 
Then, the question about semantic scope is indeed a question about the 
competence scope. The analysis of the recent Court’s case-law leads to 
the conclusion that the meaning of that concept is very broad, leaving 
hardly any aspects of intellectual property that are not	commercial or tra-
de-related (the only example we found is the author’s personal rights in 
the field of copyright).
This, however, applies only to the EU’s external relations dimension. 
When it comes to the internal market, the EU’s competence with regard 
to substantively the same rights remains shared with the Member States. 
However, the Member States are limited in their competence not only 
by legal initiatives taken by the EU in the internal market, but also are 
obliged not to compromise any initiatives taken or that are being taken 
in external action (Vatsov, 2014, p. 205.). That leaves very little room for 
manoeuvre for the Member States.
That also reflects the general tendency that is observed in the Court’s ca-
se-law concerning the EU’s external powers (Larik, 2015, pp. 797–798). 
The discussed issue of implied	exclusive	competence is yet another exam-
ple of broadening the EU’s exclusive competence when interpreting the 
actual scope of the common commercial policy.
Such a structure of reasoning is disappointing for many reasons. We 
do not wish to advocate for any political options (more autonomy to the 
Member States vs more competence to the Commission that represents 
the Union), albeit we would expect more coherence and consequence 
from the Court’s case-law. However, as we have described above, there 
are too many self-contradicting points in the Court’s lines of reasoning as 
well as too many interpretative ‘innovations’ not to have an impression 
that the question of the EU’s competence in intellectual property rights 
belongs rather to political discussion where legal arguments form a little 
part of many others.
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Kompetencje Unii Europejskiej a prawa własności intelektualnej.  
Wewnętrznie dzielone, zewnętrznie wyłączne? 
 
Streszczenie
Kompetencje wyłączne Unii Europejskiej w relacjach zewnętrznych tej organi-
zacji są przedmiotem wielu debat za każdym razem gdy ma dojść do zawarcia przez 
UE umowy międzynarodowej. W ostatnich latach szczególną uwagę przywiązuje się 
do planowanego zawierania przez UE umów o wolnym handlu, w której to dziedzi-
nie Traktaty przyznają Unii kompetencje wyłączne. Problem zakresu tych kompe-
tencji okazuje się szczególnie problematyczny w odniesieniu do ochrony własności 
intelektualnej. W tej dziedzinie Unii Europejskiej przyznano kompetencje wyłączne 
jedynie w zakresie handlowych aspektów tej dziedziny. W niniejszym artykule bada-
my jak pojęcie „handlowych aspektów własności intelektualnej” interpretowane jest 
w orzecznictwie Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej (TSUE). Rozważamy 
także skutki, jakie nieść może za sobą szeroka wykładnia tego pojęcia zapropono-
wana przez Trybunał. W związku z tym, w niniejszym artykule po pierwsze, omó-
wiliśmy linię orzeczniczą TSUE rozpoczętą wyrokiem w sprawie Daiichi Sankyo. 
Następnie ustalamy i dokonujemy oceny metod wykładni przyjętych przez Trybunał 
w ramach tej linii orzeczniczej. Jest to szczególnie istotne dla przewidzenia dalszego 
rozwoju orzecznictwa w tym zakresie. Odnosimy też powyższe wnioski TSUE do 
regulacji rynku wewnętrznego, dochodząc do wniosku, że odmienne podejścia przy-
jęte przez Trybunał w relacjach zewnętrznych oraz w ramach rynku wewnętrznego 
wykluczają się wzajemnie i prowadzą do prawnego czy interpretacyjnego impasu. 
Mimo że przedstawiona w niniejszym artykule analiza odnosi się do konkretnego 
i szczegółowego problemu, to wywiedzione na jej podstawie wnioski pozwalają na 
zrozumienie przyczyn prawnych i politycznych komplikacji towarzyszących zawie-
raniu przez Unię Europejską umów o wolnym handlu.
 
Słowa kluczowe: kompetencje wyłączne Unii Europejskiej, relacje zewnętrzne Unii 
Europejskiej, handlowe aspekty własności intelektualnej, wspólna polityka handlowa
